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A Producer’s Propensity to Conserve Framework: Application to a US and Australian
Conservation Program
Introduction
The increasing recognition of the environmental impact of agriculture has led to increasing public
activity to mitigate or correct negative externalities from such activities around the world. We
find there exist important differences in approaches to public investment in conservation between
countries as well as different courses for innovation and improvement. The contrast presented
here is between the US Governments national program and the Victorian Government (Australia)
program currently operating at the state level. Initially, US programs were heavily payment
dependent, which created a sense of entitlement, later focusing on compensating producer costs
of participation and opportunity cost, and strove for mass participation. Recently Australian
programs have emerged less concerned with producer expectations but focusing more on meeting
public resource concerns and cost effectiveness.
The following section describes the concept of a producer’s propensity to conserve and how
policy implementation may be influenced by it. It can be used as a framework to understand why
(not) producers participate and what their expectations may be from a conservation program. The
framework is also used to describe the potential returns to a producer from conservation, in the
form of government grants/incentives and from improvements in on farm productivity (less water
borne diseases, better pasture management etc). The framework provides a useful starting point
when considering what type of conservation program to run and program cost effectiveness.
An Australian and US conservation program are compared and contrasted to demonstrate the use
of the framework.
Producers Propensity to Conserve Framework
A producer’s conservation propensity function (CPF) can be described as follows:
CPF=f (Net Benefits / Individual Characteristics; Physical Conditions; Financial Conditions
(including initial costs); Policy Variables; etc.)2
Policy implementation can then focus on this function for program success which is often
dependent upon high levels of participation based on producer’s perceptions and individual
program benefits. These perceptions are based on their individual farming enterprises, not on the
broader set of environmental amenities that might be created from participation. This can be
illustrated by Figure 1 below. On the x-axis are the producers that can provide environmental
goods and services and on the y-axis is the dollar benefit to the landholder from undertaking
conservation activities (without a subsidy or grant). Figure 1 focuses on the financial conditions
of the producers to demonstrate how propensity to conserve may vary.































MRC1 shows the hypothetical marginal return to conservation curve is illustrated here starting
from a point where a perceived direct benefit from this conservation program is $200. Many
producers might undertake conservation of their own accord, given the private benefit. However,
they may not be aware of the specific activities to achieve both the conservation outcomes and
the financial return. Extension and eduction programs may be useful in providing this type of
information if the government desires more environmental outcomes.
As one moves to the right on the x-axis, incentives need to be applied to enlist a producer.
Consider the offsetting cost function, OS1 in Figure 1, as the payment necessary to make a
producer neutral to the conservation activity. To the right of A  producers require financial
compensation in order to offset their opportunity cost of undertaking conservation activities.
One could shift the perceived MRC1 upwards through a change in producer’s attitudes towards
conservation to lessen the offsetting cost required such that subsidy payments would only be3
necessary for the last 45% of adopters. This assumes that the attitudinal changes provide
producers with sufficient benefit (utility) to offset the financial costs.
A conservation program could be judged cost effective if it paid only the amount a producer
needed (the opportunity cost) to undertake the conservation activities. In addition, the program
would need to ensure it is only providing financial assistance to those that can provide
environmental goods and services – the program can assess the environmental goods and services
it is producing.
Case studies
What follows are two short program descriptions that are then contrasted to illustrate the
difference in both programs and possible future directions between the US and Victoria
conservation programs.
The U.S. Example: Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program  (CREP)
The CREP is a 1996 extension of the 1985 Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). These are
voluntary programs, however, national water quality regulations are beginning to provide an
incentive for farmers to be involved in CREP. In the CRP, producers bid for program
participation to set land aside in conserving uses for a decade. Bidders are ranked on the
conservation value of their land and the level of their bid. Those accepted receive annual
payments from the federal department of agriculture (USDA). CREP is also a land set aside
program but specific to certain conservation practices required of the farmer in addition to a land
set-aside.
In these programs, the productivity of the farm and extent of change to achieve conservation are
critical to participation. For example, in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, dairy and cow-calf
operators farm pastures with some of the highest carrying capacities in the US. However, stock
can cause a severe physical toll on waterways, adding to problems of fecal coli contamination
and stream bank soil erosion leading to increased sediment loads, detrimental impacts on wildlife
habitat, and other downstream concerns.
One of the goals of CREP in the Valley is to provide incentives to producers to guard against
cattle’s damage to stream beds and water quality. In this case CREP provides a 50% cost share on
stream fencing, alternative watering facilities, and stream bank stabilization. The US Natural4
Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) provides technical assistance to farmers for such
actions through its local offices. Farmers draw up a conservation plan for management practices
and infrastructure investment with technical assistance from NRCS. This is the basis for entry
into the program, so the locally available technical assistance is critical.
The institutional structure and a history of incentive driven participation in this voluntary
program  makes the producer’s focus on his/her perceived benefits and costs critical to
participation. The federal agency’s goal to increase participation encourages making the program
more attractive to a producer’s bottom line. Because bidding into this program is only quasi
competitive, the incentive level tends to increase, moving to the right in Figure 1, offsetting
higher perceived costs to increase participation. Producer costs and benefits from streambed
exclusion become paramount. One can envision a series of these individual costs and benefits
across all producers in the Valley which, in theory, could predict the likely rate of adoption of
streambed exclusion. Such analysis is an important part of the analysis for US programs (NRCS
2005). Table 1 is a template for such a cost consideration for a Shenandoah operation with 100
head (50 cows and 50 calves). This illustrates what a producer may consider in his/her decision.
In this case it would be in the producer’s interest to undertake the conservation activities without
compensation. The producer is at the left axis of Figure 1. A similar account for the benefits side
is presented in Table 2 below.






Probability Monetary Value Annualized Cost
Loss of Convenience
Well/trough maintenance 2 hours work/week 100 $10/hour $1,000
Loss of Pasture Land 1.2 Ha 100 $173 $210
Loss of Easy Access
Build stream
pass-through 100 $5,000 $550
Loss of Shade for Cattle
Construct shade




management 100 $25/occurance $750
 
  TOTAL $2,5005
Table 2. Maximum Producer Direct Potential Annual Benefits – No Subsidy  (in $US)
Item Potential Gain or
Averted Loss
Perceived
Probability Monetary Value Annualized Cost
Herd Health        
Reduced foot problems 6 Vet visits 100 $200 $1,200
Less water borne diseases 5 calves/year 100 $100 $500
Generally less calf loss 2 calves/year 100 $100 $400
Increased daily gain      
Pasture Management  
Better forage utilization and
grazing distribution
+2 animal units $100 $300 $600
Reduced soil erosion      not  applicable
Reduced downstream impact      not  applicable
Better water quality      not  applicable
Improved wildlife habitat      not  applicable
     TOTAL $2,700
To improve participation both the level of the subsidy and the possibility of changing perception
of farmers about conservation should be important in the US. What exists is a focus on the cost to
producers (both direct and opportunity cost) as a basis to incentives for participation. The
introduction of producer cost based program tends to create a program based offsetting cost curve
that is often above the mirror image of most producer’s perceived cost curves in order to expand
participation. Setting what might be a high reserve price for participation over and above the true
opportunity cost. Raising the producer’s perceived marginal return to conservation curve –
reducing the offsetting cost required is practiced less.
Under the U.S. programs, less may be achieved than desired unless more specific
environmental benefits can be calculated and ascribed to specific individual producers. The 1966
Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP) in the US included a high degree of targeting
based on cost effectiveness that could be placed in the context of potential environmental benefits
from a producer or a limited geographical area. However, this form of targeting does not ensure
cost effectiveness, the program could improve by measuring the environmental benefit for each
farm and providing funds to low cost producers, were cost is determined per unit environment
benefit obtained.6
When this program was greatly expanded with the 2002 Farm Act, many of the targeting aspects
of the program were excluded under the new authority to more broadly spread participation. One
unanswered question is whether targeting to improve environmental benefits can be
accomplished increasingly through the alternative of changing producer’s perceptions to better
perceive individual and common advantages where benefits are high. This would mitigate the
requirement for a high level of program benefits as offsetting costs.
The Victorian Example: EcoTender
The institutional structure of the Commonwealth Australian government and it States allow the
states to act independently of the commonwealth. They have their own environmental budgets
and there is pressure on them to perform well. What follows is a description of an innovative
Australian program that lowers cost of procuring environmental outcomes through structured
competitive bidding and specifically incorporates multiple amenity values.
In 2001-03 Victoria implemented a program called BushTender (Stoneham et al 2003), which
was loosely based on the US CRP program. BushTender used an auction system to distribute
environmental funds to landholders in return for providing terrestrial biodiversity outcomes on
their properties. The implementation of BushTender led to approximately 5000 hectares of native
vegetation on private land being secured under management agreements.  In economic terms, it
created the supply side of a market for nature conservation, and generated significant cost savings
when compared with typical grant-based systems for distributing conservation funds to
landholders.
Victoria explicitly recognised that farmers are willing and able to make informed businesses
decisions. They will put aside land and or manage their land and water resources if they can
generate a return equal to or in excess of current activities. Therefore the Victorian Government
set about allocating land management contracts that provide benefits to terrestrial biodiversity,
BushTender.
The Bush Tender program focused on the right hand side of Figure 1, to the right of the intercept
at 20% adoption. It was assumed farmers would have undertaken actions to left given they would
provide positive economic returns to the farmer. Alternatively, if there are positive returns to7
producers they would bid lower and government would get their desired environmental outcomes
at a lower cost.
EcoTender is based on the highly successful BushTender trial that took place in Victoria during
2001-2003. The $500,000 EcoTender pilot is an initiative of the Victorian Department of Primary
Industries (DPI), funded by the National Action Plan (NAP) for Salinity and Water Quality
Market Based Instruments Program (MBI).
EcoTender is the next advance in the application of market-based instruments to solve
environmental problems on private land. Whereas BushTender focused on a single environmental
outcome (increasing terrestrial biodiversity), EcoTender aims to achieve multiple environmental
benefits including reductions in the amount of saline land and improvements in in-stream water
quality.
Key to the success of the tender process is the gathering of previously ‘missing information’
linking landholder actions on farm with environmental objectives. If relevant information is
gathered and shared between buyers (government) and sellers (landholders) of environmental
goods and services, new markets can be created for these products.
The EcoTender process ensures that the government has the information it needs to be able to
directly link environmental outcomes with actions on private land. Rather than use site data (eg
erosion on site) to select intervention locations environmental programs need to focus where the
impact is occurring, which generally is off site. Accurate spatial resolution and location
information are critical to the process.
EcoTender as with BushTender focuses on the outcomes of the program. For instance, the action
of replacing pasture with indigenous trees results in a measurable output such as a reduction in
erosion at the site. EcoTender is interested in the outcomes that would result from the restoration
and maintenance of remnant vegetation including a reduction in erosion – thus the importance of
connectivity within the landscape. For example we are interested in whether a reduction in
erosion will contribute to improving stream health.
For instance, a reduction in erosion can be described in the following steps. 1. Fall in erosion, 2.
Fall in erosion to stream, and 3, Reduced impact on riverine flora and fauna. This is followed by
an assessment of the significance of the flora and fauna within the context of local and regional8
stream networks. The final outcome could be an aggregate of the service provided to riverine
flora and fauna, adjusted for river significance. The outcome used to assess the bids is limited by
available scientific information.
This program design recognizes a correlation between the production of environmental outcomes.
That is for one action a number of environmental outcomes may be reduced. For instance
revegetation with native species provides benefits to terrestrial biodiversity as well as water
quality benefits (reduced nutrient runoff), less erosion to stream and carbon sequestration (need
to be careful with carbon because there is a market now, may not be considered a public good any
longer). Also reduces groundwater accessions thus reducing saline land.
Further, a number of studies have suggested that conservation programs using a range of
mechanisms (grants, taxes) have been inefficient because they have focused on on-site
information rather than environmental outcomes (Ribaudo 1986, Wu and Bogess 1999, Wu and
Skelton-Groth 2002). For example some US conservation programs have focused on on-site
physical criteria, such as soil erosion and recharge, rather than the benefit to the environment of a
reduction in erosion or recharge. There is a growing recognition that environmental outcomes are
correlated – benefits are jointly produced by the same action. For instance, revegetation may
jointly produce carbon, improvements to water quality and wildlife benefits. Wu and Bogess
(1999) refer to this as an ecosystem-based approach that recognises the interaction between
alternative environmental benefits. They show that an efficient fund allocation must account for
both physical production relationships between environmental outcomes and the value (to the
environment) of those outcomes.
The environmental outcomes were chosen in EcoTender because they were considered to be
public goods. That is the market would not provide these goods as there is no monetary
incentives for farmers to change their landuse practices. Also the outcomes have public value and
the public needs to make decisions about what they want and how much money to spend.
In EcoTender it was not possible to determine what the single most important outcome is. This
relies upon either having scientific information relating to the threat to flora and fauna for
prioritization. Alternatively you could prioritize based on preferences which would require
information about what society prefers. This is generally not available, so best judgment has to be
used. Suggested methods for eliciting this information are CV, CM, past budget allocations, the9
Minister etc. The first two require imparting a lot of scientific information to members of the
public and asking them to make a decision about preferences. However, it is widely recognised
that this method is very costly if done well and is fraught with many other problems.
The following table summarizes the outcomes used in the pilot.
Table 3. Summary of outcomes, service and significance














(tonnes of soil / ha to stream)
∆ water quantity
(mm of water / ha to stream)
Decrease  (not in pilot)
Saline land area ∆ saline land
(ha with groundwater < 2m)







The pre-1750 environmental conditions benchmark was also used to calculate the final aggregate
score. For each of the environmental outcomes the pre-1750 and current stock of each outcome
was calculated under steady state conditions (see 4 below).







1 418,140 19,081 399,059
Saline land area (<2m) 83,702 127,153 43,451
Aquatic function 27,070 94,320 67,250
   1) Applied to both remnant management and re-vegetation
For each site assessed in the auction equation (1) was applied to determine the aggregate score.





















Ai, Si and Bi are the aquatic, saline and biodiversity outcomes for site i
 DA, DS and DB are the aquatic, saline and biodiversity differences from Table  above
In effect the above equation calculates the total percentage movement towards pre-1750
conditions for each of the environmental outcomes.
Carbon is dealt with as a market good and landholders are paid separately for each unit produced.
The selection of bids is based only on the Total Score and the cost of the bid, farmers adjust their
bid given the knowledge they will receive carbon payments if their bid is accepted.
One of the key motivations EcoTender was the hypothesis that environmental outcomes are
jointly produced and this feature might improve the cost effectiveness of funds allocated to the
environment. In order to determine if outcomes are jointly produced a random sample of sites
were assessed for saline land, carbon, terrestrial biodiversity and aquatic function. These sites
were then sorted to determine whether they were producing more than one outcome – for the
single action revegetation. Analysis of the simulation results derived for all sites with the pilot
suggest that 73% generate two or more environmental goods supporting the hypothesis that
environmental outcomes are jointly produced from a single landuse change.
Further, if outcomes are jointly produced there may be scope to reduce total costs if outcomes are
correlated. For instance the use of one outcome as a proxy for others may reduce the level of
model reporting and complexity. This may save time and reduce the transaction costs associated
with estimating outcomes. In order to test if outcomes can be used as proxies for one another the
outcomes are tested for spatial correlation.
The table below shows the correlation matrix between the metrics for aquatic function, saline
land, carbon and the significance indices for terrestrial biodiversity, for the whole catchment.








Saline Land 0.16 0.06 1
BLB 0.03 -0.07 -0.09 1
LC 0.09 -0.06 -0.17 0.64 111
Results presented in Table 5 suggest that there is a very low correlation at the catchment scale
between outcomes, and as such we would expect a lot of variability in the total score (sum of
outcomes) reflecting landscape variability. These results support the need to estimate the
outcomes for each site during the auction because no assumptions can be made about the level or
ratio of outcomes. The catchment modeling framework used in EcoTender can provide ex ante
data on expected outcomes. There is a temptation to use this data to target areas with the aim of
reducing the number of site/farm visits thereby saving time (reducing costs) or achieving greater
outcomes (areas with ex ante high outcome scores).
The following is an example of targeting areas of the catchment based on high outcome scores. 4
below shows the histogram for aquatic function outcomes for each site within the catchment
(approximately 1.4 million units each of 50*50 metre resolution). Using tools built into the CMF
specific areas of the histogram can be remapped by selecting a range.
Figure 4. Catchment - Aquatic Function Histogram










For this example land areas that scored aquatic function greater than 15 were mapped to show
their location within the catchment. This showed there was a concentration of land in the south
east of the catchment scoring high for aquatic function. It may be possible to target these areas
for land use change reducing the costs by not visiting other areas of the catchment, were aquatic
function the primary outcome of interest. However, it was shown above that there is a very low
correlation between outcomes, so targeting this area may reduce the overall quantum of
outcomes.
Selected range for targeting12
While it may be tempting to target high impact areas the cost of undertaking actions in these
areas may be high. It may be possible to target areas with lower aquatic impact at a lower cost,
thus reducing the cost per unit outcome. The overall cost for a given level of aquatic function
would be lower. The auction approach adopted in the pilot makes the most of both the
heterogenous nature of the outcomes and costs. It may be possible to identify other areas with a
lower aquatic function score but increase the scores of one or more of the other outcomes,
generating greater outcomes in aggregate, assuming the purchaser is indifferent between
outcomes.
Conclusions
•  The methodology applied in EcoTender links landuse and management with biophysical
crop growth and environmental processes on a site-specific basis with the capacity to
assess the off-site impacts at both the farm and sub-catchment scales.  This approach
accounts for spatial variability and connectivity within the landscape in a way that is not
yet in practice in the U.S. The scientific framework of EcoTender has shown that using
site based measures alone are not suitable metrics for the allocation of environmental
funds for the prevention of catchment (water shed) scale environmental problems.
•  EcoTender demonstrates the value of adopting a holistic catchment modelling framework
to inform a market-based auction process.
•  Further the EcoTender has shown that targeting a single outcome is not sufficient to
capture the heterogeneity of landscape change at the farm scale. Combining this
information with auctions for landuse change provides the opportunity to purchase
environmental outcomes more cost effectively than current grant based approaches.
•  The U.S. approach is really and incentive program as compared to Victorian approach.13
•  The U.S. approach provides landholders with an incentive to seek money, however it
provides little incentive for producers to implement measures on behalf of the government
cost effectively.
•  The structured auction approach introduces competition so farmers recognise they need to
be able to provide the outcomes on a cost effective basis to be competitive. Associated
high subsidies may create a culture of expectation, “I deserve to have money given to me
because it has been done in the past.” “I have the right to farm.” etc.
•  An alternative view may be society (through the creation of laws etc) has given farmers
the right to own land and water. One method of compensating landholders is to treat the
environmental outcomes they produce/depleting as market goods and pay them for
providing them (reducing the depletion rates).
•  The U.S. approach generally adopt on-site criteria to allocate funds, this is not the most
cost effective way to go as shown in EcoTender.14
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